Here, in the gas proof, bomb proof basement of Derby House, the Battle of The Atlantic was masterminded, and a great victory won. From these bunkers, the Western Approaches, under the inspired leadership of Admiral Sir Max Horton, took hold of the largest collection of vessels ever assembled in history. Popularly known as "the citadel" this was the worlds first combined operations command HQ, and became the prototype for all such establishments around the world.

The Battle of the Atlantic was probably the most crucial battle of the whole of WW2. Twice within 25 years, German U boats had attacked Britain's sea lanes with devastating results. In the early part of WW2, "Wolf Packs" very nearly brought out seaborne trade to a complete standstill. Without these very essential supplies, the United Kingdom population would have starved within 3 weeks to a month. Something clearly had to be done, and done fast! As Winston Churchill wrote "Battles may be won or lost, but dominating all out power to carry on the war, or even ourselves alive, lay our mastery of the ocean routes and the free approach and entry to our ports".

Hitler's most secret and effective weapon was "enigma", a coding machine used to convey vital intelligence to his submarine fleet in the Atlantic. Using more than a hundred keys, the code was almost unbreakable and baffled the experts at Bletchley Park. Following a dramatic chase in the Mediterranean, two British sailors entered a sinking U boat and rescued the enigma machine and its code books, passing them to a young sailor before they both drowned. This amazing act of heroism gave the experts the break that they needed, and it meant that we could read the German's top secret submarine instructions. It was here in the de-coding room that these instructions were translated and the recoded information transmitted to the Air and Sea Forces in the Atlantic, enabling them to hunt down and destroy the submarines.

There are many different versions of how the enigma code machine came into British hands. This is a variation of what did actually happen. Bletchley Park managed to get their hands on several machines throughout the course of the war, taken from weather ships and captured U boats alike. See my Enigma page, for details.

In 1942, Admiral Sir Percy Noble, who was the original C in C of Western Approaches as moved to Washington and was succeeded by the famous Admiral, Sir Max Horton, one of Britain's leading submariners from WW1. his appointment signalled a shift in emphasis in the Battle of The Atlantic. From his office he directed the mightiest fight back of all time.  When he died in 1951, the King ordered that his body should be taken to Liverpool and given a State Funeral. The whole city turned out to show their respects and naval ratings from every home port lined the route to the Anglican Cathedral, where he is buried.

As this HQ occupied over 50,000 square feet, in 100 rooms, accurate communications was essential both within the walls and between HQ and other offices throughout the UK, including the War Cabinet in Whitehall. These were of course the days before fax machines and computer links, so the messages were sent and received by teleprinter, the noise and heat from these machines, working 24 hours a day, was so intense, that many of the operators suffered constant headaches. Messages were converted into paper tape and taken to the coding room for onward transmission. Many of these messages received were Top Secret, but without the coding equipment, they were useless.

The main operations room was the nerve centre of the entire operation. Here on the huge maps and diagrams of the Atlantic Ocean, convoy routes and the progress of all our shipping was depicted, charted and managed. The information being updated constantly, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Most of the vital and very skilled work was in the hands of ladies of the WRNS and the WRAF, and there were seldom less than 50 on duty at any one time. Being a Combined Services HQ, men and women of the Navy, Air Force and Marines would be working alongside each other in this massive operation that affected the lives of not just thousands of sailors, both Royal Navy and Merchant Navy, but the entire population.

As well as the Atlantic convoys, HQ Western Approaches also commanded the convoys to Murmansk and other destinations in both Russia and Northern Europe. On the large table in the centre of the room, the situation map would be located. On this chart, enemy locations could be pin pointed. Total accuracy was vital to enable the Royal Navy to search, contact and destroy the enemy. On the aircraft state board at the rear of the room, the readiness of all the RAF stations could be displayed as well as up to the minute information about current air operations. Another very essential aspect was of course - the weather! This was also being constantly updated and displayed.

The Western Approaches is a rectangular area of the Atlantic ocean lying on the western coast of the United Kingdom. It is roughly the same height as the west coast of Britain, starting directly on the coast and ending in the Atlantic roughly at Iceland. The area is particularily important to the UK, because many of the larger shipping ports lie in this area.

The term is most commonly used when discussing military actions, notably during the Battle of the Atlantic (both of them) when the German Kriegsmarine attempted to blockade the UK with U-boats operating in this area. Since almost all shipping would pass through this area, it was an excellent hunting ground and had to be heavily defended. During WWII the task was so important that it had its own commander, and the HQ was moved to Liverpool to be closer to the action, while most of the fleet HQ was in Plymouth.

The most famous commander of the Western Approaches was Admiral Sir Max Horton, who took command in November 1942 and immediately instituted a series of tactical changes in the way the escort ships were to be used. Organizing them into "support groups" and "hunter-killer groups", they were to operate at longer distances from the convoys and prevent the deadly wolfpacks from ever forming. The technique was successful: with more forces becoming available, rapidly improving technology (particularly radar), and information being provided by Ultra, the battle was soon over with the Allies successful.

I was sent a snippet of information regarding SO (Tac) at HQ Western Approaches. I note that it gives full credit to the C in C for the innovative ideas which led to the ultimate defeat of the U Boat. It fails to mention the cold hard fact that Capt Walker RN, on return to shore, went immediately to the Admiral via a waiting car, to update him on results, tactics etc and, most importantly, recommendations. It was also the idea of Captain Walker to send ships out, independently of convoys, in order to find, hunt and destroy the U Boat. This was the birth of the 'hunter killer'. Walkers recommendations and practise was adopted by the Admiralty for all naval vessels. Here is the snippet. If anyone has any information of this Cdr, I would be grateful. Walker was the 'highly experienced' anti submarine officer that Horton used, as Walker was a former CO of the ASW establishment between the wars.

Cdr Hugh Falcon-Steward's next assignment was as Staff Officer for Tactics to C in C Western Approaches at HMS Eaglet, Liverpool. Admiral Max Horton had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches Command, the previous day and may have handpicked this highly experienced former anti-submarine officer to help him develop the tactics which finally defeated the U-boat menace. Horton retained the existing convoy escorts but introduced support groups which had much more freedom to pursue submarines to the death, even if this meant leaving the convoy for longer periods of time than were considered acceptable for escort groups. Horton's support groups proved to be decisive in the crucial spring of 1943, taking the battle to the U-boats and crushing the morale of the U-boat arm with persistent and successful counterattacks.

An email from the USA. April 2010:  On reading your material on Admiral Max Horton and Western Approaches, it is possible that my father had a story of interest to you. He was an engineering officer on USS Wilkes.  On their first visit to Liverpool, he was told to take a group of five sailors to a base nearby, Greenock.  They were to get specialised training. On arriving, it turned out to be a formal training program about boarding a U boat. There was a full scale replica of a U boat's interior done in wood. After some preliminary information, the crew was assigned tasks to keep the sub from sinking.  The first person to go down the hatch was the gunner's mate assigned to the team.  He was supposed to handle any die-hard Nazis.  (As he recalled, they had been told to bring along an automatic weapon for this task.  Unfortunately, Wilkes' only such weapon was a BAR, a light machine gun of great weight and almost five feet in length.  After dropping the weapon while going down the hatch, the British trainer dryly suggested getting a sten gun, or a tommy gun as more handy.)

My dad was to go down second, and was to start by checking the sea-cocks, and then the engineering spaces. I asked him about collecting the code equipment or literature.  He said that they were not given any direction about that.  However, of the five man team, there was a radioman.  Although my father believed nothing was said about codes, I cannot see why a radio operator would have been included otherwise. This scenario made sense to me, because I never quite accepted Admiral Dan Gallery's facile explanation of how his chief engineer so easily secured U505's engineering spaces.  I would guess he went through this U boat mock up that Admiral Horton must have ordered up. Regrettably, my dad passed away, so I cannot get any more information from him, or pass any follow up questions you may have. If this information is of any use to you, I hope you will use it. From the submariners who my family knew (my father was USNA class of 39 so we knew a few), training mock ups were used a lot in the sub bases. So it makes a lot of sense to me that an old submariner would train his men on a realistic mock-up. Dennis Largess. Mt Ranier. Md. USA.

USS Wilkes

Note: I replied stating that it would make sense that, due to the extreme sensitivity of the issue, the subject of codes would not arise. The Radio Op would have been trained in boarding a U Boat and where to head for and exactly what to look for. Then, afterwards, would be ordered to forget everything he had seen or read, it would 'never' have happened!  By the way, Greenock is in Scotland, and not 'nearby' !! (see text)

Thank you Mike for including my mother's name in the dedication for Western Approaches - it means so much to us and I was thrilled. I thought it would be very appropriate if I sent you a copy of her discharge paper as confirmation of her time at Western Approaches HQ 15 Group RAF (1941-1944) and her rank, leading aircraft woman. Your website is so well researched. My next move is to apply for a Bletchley Park Medal for her. I noted that a Canadian woman had received one for her work in Ottawa receiving information on convoys. It gives me great joy to help her receive the recognition she deserves and lessens the sense of loss greatly - thank you for your assistance with this. Best regards, Gillian (McCarthy).